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In November 2019, the Knight First Amendment 
Institute convened a major symposium at Columbia 
University, titled “The Tech Giants, Monopoly 
Power, and Public Discourse,” to address concerns 
arising from the dominance of a small number 
of technology companies over a wide range of 
economic and expressive activity. The essays in this 
series were originally presented and discussed at 
this two-day event. Written by scholars and experts 
in law, computer science, economics, information 
studies, journalism, political science, and other 
disciplines, the essays focus on two questions: 
how and to what extent the technology giants’ 
power is shaping public discourse, and whether 
anti-monopoly tools might usefully be deployed to 
expose or counter this power. 
The symposium was conceptualized by Knight 
Institute staff, including Jameel Jaffer, Executive 
Director; Katy Glenn Bass, Research Director; Alex 
Abdo, Litigation Director; and Larry Siems, Chief 
of Staff. The essay series was edited by Glenn Bass 
with additional support from Lorraine Kenny, 
Communications Director; Sarah Guinee, Research 
Fellow; and Madeline Wood, Communications and 
Research Coordinator. 
The full series is available at knightcolumbia.org/research/
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INTRODUCTION
The introduction of new media technologies invariably brings about potent social and economic shifts. We are well into one of those shifts as the advent of the consumer internet has 
destabilized existing models of news production and distribution and 
enabled new hegemons to establish massive and powerful businesses. 
Two decades into this shift, societies are asking difficult questions about 
whether internet technologies and the business models that accompany 
them are dangerous for our citizens and our democracies.
At these moments of technological shift, it’s easy to assume that 
the business models adopted by technological innovators are inevitable 
and singular. They are not. As Paul Starr established in his magisterial 
The Creation of the Media,1 the paths taken by different nations in their 
adoption of new communication technologies (movable type, postal mail, 
telegraph, radio) depend on the politics and economics of the nation as a 
whole and vary widely from country to country.
This variance continues with the internet, even though the domi-
nance of the United States – and Silicon Valley in particular – creates 
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the illusion that a single economic and legal system governs our online 
spaces. This illusion obscures possible solutions to the challenges arising 
around the socially corrosive effects of new media technologies. Because 
we see the dominance of the internet by Google, Facebook, and others as 
inevitable, the solution space we consider for combatting mis-/disinforma-
tion, polarization, and promotion of extremism is overly constrained. Our 
solutions cannot be limited to asking these platforms to do a better job of 
meeting their civic obligations – we need to consider what technologies 
we want and need for digital media to have a productive role in demo-
cratic societies.
At this moment, it’s worth considering the historical introduction of 
new technologies – radio and television in particular – and examining the 
different models societies chose to regulate these technologies. In particu-
lar, it’s worth reconsidering the history of public service broadcasting, an 
intervention pioneered in Britain in the 1920s that redefined the relation-
ship between governments, media producers, and citizens and influenced 
policies around the world. While the spirit of public service media may 
have its roots in Britain, the specific interventions appropriate for the 
internet – already a mature and influential technology – may need to be 
modeled on the rollout of public service broadcasting in the United States 
half a century later. In that situation regulators acted many years after the 
advent of a new technology to correct market failures.
The goal of this essay is not to propose a specific plan to implement 
public service digital media in the United States or elsewhere but to intro-
duce the question of what we might want such media to do – it’s a possi-
ble strategy, not a discussion of the specific tactics needed to achieve it. 
Our responses to the challenges of the contemporary media ecosystem are 
marked by failures of imagination. So long as we are wedded to the idea 
that a few large companies will set the rules for speech and discussion 
online, we will constrain the solution space of possible interventions. My 
goal is neither to eliminate the powerful internet platforms nor to cede the 
future to them – it is to imagine possible futures where surveillant adver-
tising delivered by monopoly providers isn’t the only available option to 
build a thriving future of democratic communications.
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RADIO 1912–1927: THE MAKING OF 
“THIS NEW NOISE”
Anyone who marvels at the speed at which the internet has transformed modern life would likely find parallels in the history of radio. Guglielmo Marconi’s experiments in wireless telegraphy 
– sending bursts of static through the radio spectrum – began in 1894, and 
fifteen years later commercial telegraphy between nations was common-
place.2 Consider that the first internet-capable computer, the Interface 
Message Processor,3 was built in 1969 and that fifteen years later, in 1984, 
email was used almost solely by academics and computer experts.4 Simi-
larly, it’s now been thirty years since Tim Berners-Lee laid down the archi-
tecture for the World Wide Web,5 the user-friendly, graphical interface to 
the internet that’s now pervasively used. Radio reached full penetration of 
global political and cultural life far more quickly.
Radio as we know it – the transmission of speech, music, and orga-
nized sound via electromagnetic waves – became practical in 1912 with 
the advent of the triode vacuum tube amplifier.6 From the moment radio 
became practically possible to the moment it became a powerful cultural 
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force is roughly fifteen years, from 1912 to 1927. What occurred in those 
fifteen years was a gold rush that resembles the late 1990s internet boom 
in its passion and energy but differs sharply in the diversity of models pur-
sued. A comparison between business models that emerged in the United 
States, the USSR, and the United Kingdom is helpful to understand how a 
single technology can lead to diverse techno-social systems.
Starting around 1920, hundreds of different organizations in the 
United States became radio broadcasters. Some were hobbyists, running 
tiny stations out of their homes, but due to the costs and technical exper-
tise involved, most of radio’s early adopters were existing organizations: 
universities and churches on the noncommercial side but also depart-
ment stores, hotels, and other organizations eager to promote their brand 
through this new medium.7 John Wanamaker’s department stores in Phil-
adelphia and New York – which as early as 1911 had pioneered “remote” 
shopping by allowing customers on ships to order goods from his stores 
via wireless telegraphy – began broadcasting recordings of Italian tenor 
Enrico Caruso over the radio on May 13, 1914. (In an instance that will give 
pause to anyone hoping to increase civility online, one of the passengers 
on a ship sixty miles offshore heard the broadcast and telegraphed the 
Wanamaker station to say “Am hearing music clearly but that’s a rotten 
phonograph. Get a new one and some new records.”8 Haters gonna hate.9) 
The business model for radio was not easily apparent, especially as 
early broadcasters worried that advertising in such a sensitive medium 
– one that reached into the privacy of the very home! – might offend 
sensibilities.10 Throughout the first decade of the broadcasts, radio inspec-
tors warned Wanamaker and other commercial broadcasters not to clutter 
the airwaves with advertising content. That worry evaporated in 1922 when 
AT&T entered the broadcast market with a new business model known as 
“toll broadcasting.” On August 28, 1922, an official of the Hawthorne Court 
Apartments in Jackson Heights, New York, purchased ten minutes of airtime 
on WEAF from AT&T for fifty dollars and made a telephone call to deliver 
his sales pitch to anyone tuning in.11 For AT&T, which sold time on its phone 
networks to long-distance callers, radio was a natural extension of their 
existing business, connecting a caller to many listeners instead of one.
WEAF became the flagship station of NBC in 1926 after AT&T exited 
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broadcasting, but the model that company introduced became the dom-
inant one for commercial radio (and influenced the business models of 
television and the internet as well). Networks of stations, carrying a mix of 
locally created programming and national programming syndicated over 
telephone lines, came to dominate the airwaves. This business model pro-
vided advertisers with the ability to reach local and national markets, and 
the network radio business quickly became an enviable one, with CBS and 
NBC earning $72 million in profits in 1934 and controlling 70 percent of the 
radio advertising market.12 The dominance of those companies was aided 
by the Radio Act of 1927, which created ninety-six assigned frequencies 
on the radio dial.13 Six were given to Canada; forty were declared “clear 
channels” in which only one station could operate nationally, and the 
remaining fifty were assigned to the remaining six hundred broadcasters, 
whose assigned frequencies often had geographic or time restrictions. Due 
to this frequency squeeze and other policies designed to “professionalize” 
broadcasting requiring a sixteen-hour broadcasting day, by the 1930s non-
profit broadcasters commanded less than 2 percent of the market.14
If the path of broadcasting in the United States – a chaotic period of 
excitement and expansion followed by commercial consolidation – exem-
plified American capitalism, broadcasting in the USSR similarly fulfilled 
expectations for Soviet structures. While early broadcasting experiments 
were underway in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Nether-
lands, Russia was embroiled in revolution and an ensuing civil war. Once 
the Bolshevik revolutionaries established the USSR, Soviet leaders recog-
nized that broadcasting could be a powerful tool for educating illiterate 
farmers about the benefits of communism, and helping to “reset the men-
tal horizons of its population.”15 Because most Soviet citizens could not 
afford radios, loudspeakers were installed in public squares, factories, and 
in all places that large numbers of people would commonly gather. The 
spread of radio as a propaganda tool paralleled the industrialization of the 
Soviet Union; as workers moved from farms to cities and factory towns, 
they came into closer contact with the pervasive voice of Radioperedacha, 
the Soviet national radio broadcaster.
Once the Soviet economy grew to the point where private radios 
became common, the most popular were “wired radios,” hardwired speak-
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ers offering a single channel of audio that connected virtually every build-
ing in the country. The radios of this period are fascinating to look at – 
their sole control was a volume knob, since tuning was both unnecessary 
and impossible. In the Brezhnev years, the wired radios gained second 
and third channels, an innovation that did nothing to diminish the control 
of the central authorities.16 Soviet citizens sometimes turned to shortwave 
radios to hear international programming via shortwave, but those broad-
casts, often jammed, were forced to move frequencies. In a recent essay 
on participatory propaganda, my colleague Gregory Asmolov remembers, 
as recently as 1986, the ways in which a single broadcast entity worked to 
manage public opinion and how liberating encountering other “Vrazhes-
kie golosa” (enemy voices) through shortwave radio could be.17
If the United States exemplified free market capitalism and the Soviet 
Union state control, radio in the United Kingdom was something else 
entirely. In both the United Kingdom and the United States, the need to 
coordinate technical standards and frequency assignment brought radio 
manufacturers together around 1920. In the United States, a set of patent 
agreements and attempts to ensure that the new technology would remain 
firmly in American hands led General Electric, Westinghouse, AT&T, 
American Marconi, and (oddly enough) the United Fruit Company to come 
together as investors in the Radio Corporation of America, also known 
as RCA.18 A similar set of meetings between radio pioneers in the United 
Kingdom led to the establishment of the British Broadcasting Company 
(BBC). But while American broadcasters had a long period of compara-
tively low regulation, the Post Office in the United Kingdom intervened in 
radio almost immediately, with the postmaster general declaring in 1922 
that “it would be impossible to have a large number of firms broadcast-
ing.”19 Instead of department stores, telephone companies, and churches 
competing to create this new medium, the Post Office charged the BBC 
with the responsibility of creating content for the nation.
The BBC had several enormous advantages over their U.S. counter-
parts. Not only did it have an enviable monopoly, it had a guaranteed reve-
nue stream from the annual license fees levied on each radio receiver sold. 
The stability provided by this funding allowed the BBC’s first director, 
John Reith, to declare a social mission for the company above and beyond 
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market demands: radio was to be the British citizen’s “guide, philosopher, 
and friend,” seeking to “inform, educate and entertain,” in that order.20 
BBC’s success in meeting those lofty goals has been mixed over the years, 
but its success overall has been remarkable and influential, inasmuch as 
most European countries adopted a BBC-like model in establishing public 
service media as the primary form of broadcast media.
A critical part of the BBC model was the independence of the corpo-
ration from government control over programming. Without this distinc-
tion, it’s possible to imagine UK radio following a path closer to the USSR 
model of government control. The BBC’s independence was tested early in 
its existence, when a national strike in 1926 shuttered the nation’s news-
papers, briefly making the broadcaster the sole source of news. Anxious 
to be seen as independent, Reith gave voice to both government and labor 
leaders. The unique experience listeners had of hearing both groups offer 
their arguments in their own voices and words transformed UK politics 
and put the BBC at the center of the nation’s political dialogues.21 
Reith articulated the public service vision of the BBC, but the vision 
was implemented most visibly by Hilda Matheson, the BBC’s first Director 
of Talks. The BBC initially used Reuters for its news reports, in deference 
to newspapers, who feared competition in reporting, but began original 
reporting under Matheson in 1928. She also invented the modern interview 
format, replacing lectures and speeches with conversational presentations 
and panel discussions and broadcasting the first live political debate. 
Matheson was a fascinating and complicated figure, avowedly liberal, 
sympathetic to socialism and to the League of Nations, vocal about wom-
en’s rights and widely known to be a lesbian.22 
She was also an intelligence officer, serving with MI5 during the First 
World War and becoming the director of the Joint Broadcasting Commit-
tee during the Second World War, countering German propaganda with 
pro-British propaganda. Matheson saw the political and social power of 
“this new noise” to shape public opinion and sentiment early on, and her 
vision for the broadcaster, combined with Reith’s more conservative one, 
helped shape the BBC into a model of media in service to the public. What 
could have been purely the voice of empire became something more com-
plicated, a powerful force dedicated to amplifying distant and underheard 
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voices that provided a factual anchor for an energetic and sometimes 
florid press. The importance of BBC’s fiscal independence is impossible 
to understate. It’s unclear that there was a market for the BBC’s most 
ambitious experiments, and difficult to imagine what the BBC might have 
programmed had it answered primarily to the dictates of the market rather 
than the social mission Reith and Matheson articulated.
The three models explored by the United States, the USSR, and the 
United Kingdom were not the only possible ones. We can imagine a world 
in which the government had not intervened to manage the radio spec-
trum, one where the chaotic model of American radio in the early 1920s 
held sway globally. Equally, we can imagine a dedicated public service 
broadcaster with market competition for audiences, the situation the BBC 
faces now, rather than the protected market they were born into. But the 
diversity of these existing cases demonstrates how different the introduc-
tion of the same technology can be in different political and economic 
contexts.
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THREE MODELS FOR THE INTERNET
Armed with the historical lessons of radio, we can consider the various ways the internet has been adopted globally, a single set of technologies leading to sharply different tech-
no-social models. The goal, as with radio, is not to provide a comprehen-
sive overview of all models for internet adoption – the decision of North 
Korea to limit internet access only to political elites is a possible model, 
though not a very interesting one – but to examine representative models 
embraced by major players on the internet. Again, the lesson is that a 
particular business model is not inevitable but the product of political, 
economic and cultural forces.
As with the advent of radio in the late 1910s, the commercialization of 
the internet, beginning around 1995, was a both creative explosion and a 
gold rush.23 Many of the early players were universities, which had been 
using the internet well before the advent of the World Wide Web – Nets-
cape, the first internet company to go public in 1995, was a product of the 
Mosaic project at the University of Illinois,24 while Yahoo! began as a side 
project for two students at Stanford.25 Other pioneers were established 
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publishers who saw an opportunity to repurpose their preexisting content 
online. Time Warner’s Pathfinder service was an early internet leader, as 
was tech chronicler Wired magazine.26 These publishers were used to a 
display advertising model: Advertisers were billed for advertising impres-
sions, whether or not those impressions led to a sale, as in magazine 
advertising.
The adoption of display advertising as a default business model led 
to a rush of interest in sites that generated many pageviews, as those 
pageviews represented billable ad views. Asking users to create content, 
as early homepage hosting sites Geocities and Tripod27 did, was a more 
efficient way of generating pageviews than using professionally edited 
content, as social networks later discovered. The problem with social 
media and participatory publishing, advertisers found, was that ad per-
formance was terrible: Very few people who saw ads clicked on them, and 
far fewer purchased products. In order to better target these ads, adver-
tising networks began collecting detailed behavioral data on their users, 
tracking their movements from one website to another. Social networks 
like Facebook could go a step further, combining behavioral data with 
information their users posted on their websites, creating complex profiles 
of information on web users that could be used to better target ads.
How well this targeted advertising works is a matter for debate, 
but the emergence of the surveillant model of advertising28 as a default 
strategy for monetizing the internet put Google and Facebook in posi-
tions of immense power. Google could connect a user’s stated interests as 
expressed in search terms to their online behavior, while Facebook could 
match a user’s path through the web to personal details they shared with 
their friends. Both built powerful and pervasive ad networks, selling space 
not only on their sites but across the web as well – Google’s AdWords 
product is a default tool for many small website owners seeking to gen-
erate revenue from their websites. Together, the two companies control 
59.3% of the global ad market, and in recent years, the only growth in the 
market has been the growth of ads on the duopoly’s network.29
The power of large web companies like Google and Facebook comes 
not only from their dominance of online business models but also from 
their ability to direct attention, the fundamental currency of the media 
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world. As Facebook has become a key source of referrals to new websites, 
news companies have begun publishing directly to Facebook and shar-
ing a fraction of the revenue Facebook generates from the accompanying 
advertising. The net result is that these publishers are no longer wholly 
on the web – a significant part of their publishing is in the closed, un-au-
ditable ecosystems controlled by the platforms. This phenomenon has 
dangerous implications: The “pivot to video” many news organizations 
attempted, firing writing staff in the process, was predicated on false 
information from Facebook designed to encourage the publishing of more 
video content.30 In a real sense, Google, Facebook, and a few other large 
companies like Amazon control significant parts of the digital economy – 
it’s impossible to run a media retail business without considering Ama-
zon, just as it’s impossible to run a content business without considering 
Google and Facebook.
One country where Google and Facebook have very little power and 
influence is China, where government censorship, designed to control 
online expression, had the interesting side effect of protecting China’s 
domestic internet market from foreign competitors. While many Chinese 
dissidents, journalists, and fans of western movies became skilled at 
“jumping the Great Firewall,” China’s domestic market and linguistic iso-
lation were significant enough to enable a rich and complex local internet 
ecosystem.
American scholars make two predictable mistakes in explaining the 
Chinese online ecosystem. The first is to assume that because there is 
pervasive censorship on the Chinese internet, conversations are boring, 
sterile, or apolitical. Nothing could be further from the truth. Chinese 
online culture is rooted in bulletin board systems based around local uni-
versities, where online conversations are rowdy and free-flowing, stepping 
up to and occasionally across government-mandated red lines. That spirit 
has continued as China has built its own set of social networks, starting 
with the Twitter-like Sina Weibo and continuing with WeChat/Weixin, 
which superficially resembles WhatsApp. Censorship is baked into these 
platforms, as platform operators must monitor online content and remove 
offending posts or risk losing their operating licenses. But Chinese neti-
zens have reacted to this environment with creativity, developing complex 
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visual vocabularies to talk about forbidden topics, employing humor and 
wordplay to carve out freedom of expression under censorship.31
The second mistake scholars make is to assume that the Chinese inter-
net is a copy of American internet services, a narrative that aligns with 
broader dismissals of Chinese technical innovation by American commen-
tators.32 WeChat, the dominant social platform in China, looks a bit like 
WhatsApp to a non-Chinese user. Users chat with friends, one on one or in 
groups, trading photos and other digital media. But WeChat is much more: 
a marketplace for downloadable and streaming digital content, a currency 
and payment system, an ecosystem that supports thousands of third-party 
applications, including taxi and delivery services. When we see Facebook 
proposing to launch a global digital currency, it’s best understood as 
Facebook trying to catch up to Tencent, WeChat’s parent company, which 
has the sort of closed and controlled internet environment that Facebook 
can only dream of.33
The result of China’s decisions to censor foreign social media plat-
forms and develop domestic alternatives has been an ecosystem that’s 
even more controlled and walled off than Google's and Facebook’s 
environments. While Google and YouTube feel like different sites and 
user experiences, united by a common user authentication and adver-
tising networks, WeChat feels like an immersive environment, more like 
pre-Web internet services like America Online than the chaos of the Web. 
Unlike state control of radio in the USSR, which led to drab and boring 
propaganda, China’s unique forms of control have led to a hypercapital-
ist concentration of monopoly power and wealth surpassing the wildest 
dreams of American monopolists and the darkest nightmares of privacy 
advocates.34
With the models of capitalist monopoly and capitalist hypermonop-
oly to choose from, it’s helpful that a third business model exists, even if 
it’s significantly less widespread. Outside of China, where it is blocked, 
Wikipedia consistently ranks in the top 10 most popular websites. Unlike 
the most powerful U.S. and Chinese sites, Wikipedia and its sister sites 
accept no advertising, conduct no user tracking, and sell no user data. 
Wikimedia, Wikipedia’s parent organization, is a nonprofit with an annual 
budget of $80 million per year.35 That makes it large in nonprofit terms, 
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but Wikimedia spends roughly 0.25% of what Facebook spends a year pro-
viding services to a comparable userbase.36 Wikimedia’s primary source 
of revenue is from donations,37 though it has accepted a small number 
of multi-million-dollar foundation grants. The majority of donations to 
Wikipedia are small contributions from individual users or community 
members.
Beyond being financially supported by its community, Wikipedia is 
able to operate at such low costs because its content is provided by an 
army of volunteer authors, editors, and administrators who have worked 
out a system that provides remarkably high-quality content through an 
elaborate process of robust online debate. Active Wikipedians spend 
dozens of hours a week refining sentences and claims in articles until they 
converge on a “neutral point of view” . . . or are locked by administrators 
who despair of bringing online peace to debates like the legal status of 
Israeli settlements in Palestinian territories. While Facebook and other 
social networks rely on their users for content – your status updates and 
baby photos are ultimately Facebook’s core product – Wikimedia recog-
nizes user labor as a valuable contribution and celebrates the effort as 
such.
While Wikipedia has been a remarkable success, its model has been 
difficult to apply to projects beyond encyclopedias. Wikinews, a project to 
create an editable, contributor-driven daily newspaper, often finds itself 
competing with its far larger sibling, as breaking news is often reported in 
Wikipedia articles before it enters Wikimedia’s virtual newsroom. Proj-
ects like Wikibooks, which creates open-source textbooks, and Wikidata, 
which provides open databases, have had more success but don’t domi-
nate their sectors the way that Wikipedia does. While the server software 
that operates much of the World Wide Web is open-source software, as 
is the Firefox web browser, the online content and services business is 
dominated by the U.S. and Chinese models, with Wikipedia as the sole 
noncommercial site in the worldwide top 100 sites.38 
Wikimedia is a form of public service media, though it resembles the 
role of public radio in the United States, which is supported by a mix of 
listener donations and commercial sponsorship rather than a license fee, 
as in the BBC model. Its decisions are driven by a set of articulated and 
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well-debated values about access to knowledge and information and not 
by market signals. That it is able to survive without government support 
or a license fee is not an argument against public support for media – 
instead, it’s an open invitation to ask what other services we could build if 
we innovated outside the logic of markets more often.
The victory of the U.S. and Chinese models has a strong tendency to 
make other models seem impractical. What results is a failure of imag-
ination, an assumption that new media and services must be quickly 
sustainable through existing market models of advertising or subscription. 
To open our thinking about what’s possible online, it’s helpful to consider 
the consequences of market failures and the past systemic responses to 
those failures.
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NEWT MINOW AND THE “VAST WASTELAND”
When young lawyer and Democratic Party political activist Newt Minow became chair of the U.S. Federal Communica-tions Commission in 1961, television industry executives had 
reason to be worried. After television became the defining medium of the 
1950s, a scandal over rigged quiz shows late in the decade had rocked the 
industry, and leaders braced for government regulation. Worse for them, 
Minow was in frequent conversations with President Kennedy’s brother 
Robert about the social and civic power of television, and executives knew 
that Minow was likely to demand a stronger public service mandate for 
broadcasters.
Minow did not disappoint. In his first public speech as FCC chair, he 
addressed the annual conference of the National Association of Broadcast-
ers, challenging those in the audience to take a close look at the product 
they were creating:
I invite each of you to sit down in front of your television set when your 
station goes on the air and stay there for a day without a book, without a 
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magazine, without a newspaper, without a profit and loss sheet or a ratings 
book to distract you. Keep your eyes glued to the set until the station signs 
off. I can assure you that what you will observe is a vast wasteland.39
Minow’s term as FCC chair was brief, but he is remembered both for 
his “vast wasteland” speech and the sentiments behind it. Some consid-
ered his dismissal of entertainment television as elitist – the producers of 
Gilligan’s Island, which ran from 1964 to 1967, named the sunken ship the 
S.S. Minnow in his honor – but his insights shaped the future of public ser-
vice media in the United States. The All-Channel Receiver Act of 1961 man-
dated that television sets be capable of receiving UHF channels, a space 
used for creative experimentation and public service media by smaller 
broadcast outlets. The Communications Satellite Act of 1962 made possible 
the wireless “backbone” that public broadcasters used to syndicate their 
programming nationally.40 Ultimately, in 1967, Lyndon B. Johnson signed 
legislation establishing the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), 
which went on to form public television (PBS) and radio (NPR) networks 
in the United States. Rather than pushing existing media organizations 
out of the way, as broadcasters had feared, PBS and NPR acted more as 
complementary media, filling holes in existing programming.
The initial success of PBS was seen as addressing a market failure in 
providing educational programming, a niche that broadcasters had mostly 
filled with entertainment for kids, with educational messages squeezed 
in via public service announcements. Shows like Sesame Street became 
surrogate parents to a generation of Americans, creating an emotional 
bond strong enough that public broadcasting defenders repeatedly raised 
the specter of Congress killing beloved character Big Bird after govern-
ment skeptics sought to cut CPB funding. (Big Bird and his pals have since 
decamped to the lush corporate campus of HBO, considerably weakening 
this argument.)
More recently, as political polarization in the United States has 
increased, the importance of NPR has become clear in addressing another 
market failure: the disappearance of trusted news brands. According to 
a recent University of Missouri study, the most trusted media brands in 
the United States are local public television stations, NPR, and PBS. The 
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widely trusted television networks that dominated the news industry 
when NPR was introduced currently all have neutral or negative trust 
ratings.41 Additionally, a small number of public radio stations associated 
with NPR have maintained local newsrooms in communities that have lost 
broadcast and newspaper reporters, remaining a key source of local news 
as the broader news landscape struggles to maintain local coverage.
Public media in the United States has a very different history than in 
the United Kingdom: Public broadcasting was the sole player in the UK 
broadcast landscape for years, and its principles and practices shaped the 
ecosystem, while public broadcasting in the United States came late to 
the game as a way of addressing market failures. While UK public media 
still benefits from license fees, public media in the United States is heavily 
dependent on small donations, much like Wikipedia, and from corporate 
largess via sponsorship. What’s helpful about these two examples of pub-
lic service media is that they combine two ideas we need to imagine public 
service digital media: the ambition and comprehensive vision of the early 
BBC and the ability to complement commercial media exemplified by PBS 
and NPR.
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HOW WE MIGHT BRING ABOUT PUBLIC SERVICE 
DIGITAL MEDIA
At the advent of the new medium of radio, John Reith and his colleagues imagined radio as a powerful, pro-social force, capa-ble of enlightening and entertaining the UK public. Their imagi-
nation was paired with a revenue model that supported innovative exper-
iments and an institutional structure that allowed successful experiments 
to thrive and failures to fade away. There was no shortage of idealism at 
the advent of the commercial internet, and the success of projects like 
Wikipedia and open-source software suggests that values-driven projects 
have an important role to play online. And while extraordinary projects 
like the Mozilla Foundation have provided support for pro-social projects 
online, there’s never been a mechanism at the national scale comparable 
to public broadcasting to support pro-social online innovation.
The American model of introducing public media as a correction to 
market failures suggests that it’s possible to build ambitious public service 
media well after the advent of a new medium. That we’ve missed the BBC 
moment at the advent of the commercial internet is no reason to abandon 
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the idea. What’s needed is the willingness to think creatively about what 
we might do if we built public service digital media with the vitality and 
scale of something like the BBC. It’s worth asking how we would fund it, 
but it’s more important to ask, what would it do?
Consider a thought experiment on funding: The digital advertis-
ing industry is currently a $333 billion global market, and the share of 
advertising that’s digital continues to grow.42 Three companies that 
use intensely surveillant advertising practices – Google, Facebook, and 
Alibaba – represent $200.3 billion of that market. If we posit a 1% levy 
on highly surveillant advertising – advertising that incorporates user 
tracking, combines demographic and psychographic data to create user 
profiles, or targets using factors other than a user’s stated intentions and 
geography – we can easily posit a $1–2 billion annual fund to support pub-
lic service digital media.43 What might we do if we thought on the scale of 
a $2-billion-a-year project, twenty-two times the scale of Wikimedia44 and 
thirty-six times the size of Mozilla?45 
This is not a new idea, to be clear. Free Press has proposed a targeted 
ad tax that they anticipate could generate support for “diverse, local, 
independent and noncommercial journalism that’s gone missing, and to 
support new news-distribution models, especially those that don’t rely 
on data harvesting for revenue.”46 They propose a “Public Interest Media 
Endowment” to manage the funds generated. In May 2019, Nobel Prize–
winning economist Paul Romer proposed a progressive digital ad revenue 
tax designed to encourage platform companies to explore models other 
than surveillant advertising, like subscription-based models.47 The Romer 
model is designed to discourage companies from using surveillant adver-
tising, so the tax is likely to be significantly higher than 1-2 percent and 
increases with the size of surveillant ad revenues earned by a company. 
In February 2017, Emily Bell of Columbia’s Tow Center earlier proposed an 
endowment to support independent journalism, funded with billion-dol-
lar donations from tech giants like Google and Facebook.48 
A subsidy for independent journalism would be a worthy use for 
funds generated from a tax on surveillant advertising, but the questions 
of scale are problematic. The global newspaper industry collected $150.2 
billion in advertising and circulation revenue in 2017, down more than 
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$10 billion from 2013.49 While the revenues from a $5 billion endowment 
would be significant ($250 million a year), they cannot fill the hole in 
revenue that newspapers and other organizations are experiencing from 
a shift to digital advertising. In addition, direct support for news produc-
tion is likely to raise concerns within the United States, where conspiracy 
theories about the “deep state” and “elite media” are cited as reasons 
for mistrust in the news. The survival of high-quality, independent news 
demands a conversation about news as a public good, but the scale of the 
need makes even a Romer-style tax unlikely to solve the problem fully – 
on this topic, we need a broad-based consensus on the need for news as a 
public good for the health of democracies.
Another worthy use for a digital ad-related subsidy would be support 
for the systemic study of the social and individual effects of digital media. 
Scholars and commentators have raised concerns about the addictive 
effects of social media, the idea that social media is increasing political 
polarization and isolating people in ideological echo chambers, that social 
media might push vulnerable individuals towards extremist political 
views and that targeted advertising might be so effective that it subverts 
democratic processes. There’s little scholarly agreement about whether 
these phenomena are real, how widespread they are, and how important 
they might be50 – a recent meta-analysis of forty studies of political per-
suasion finds little evidence that any form of political persuasion works 
to change opinion,51 so there should be strong skepticism of claims from 
companies like Cambridge Analytica that they can sway votes and subvert 
democratic choice through online methods.
These questions are hard to study because they require the analysis of 
vast datasets, which requires costly server space and programming skills. 
This field of research would benefit from a dedicated pool of funding, and 
the funds imagined here would represent a massive increase over current 
funding levels. But in addition to funding, such research requires vastly 
better access to the data collected and controlled by the platform compa-
nies. Previous efforts like Social Science One have been largely unsuccess-
ful in persuading the large platforms to give scholars significant access 
to their data, and both commercial (Crimson Hexagon, Crowdtangle) and 
non-commercial (Media Cloud, Pushshift) efforts to index and make avail-
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able for study the social web are incomplete and limited in their scope. 
Significant progress in answering the major social science questions that 
center on the social web likely have to wait for legislation requiring plat-
forms to make their data more available, technical advances in differential 
privacy to make data releases more possible, as well as funding.
In addition to any content creation or research roles our new entity 
takes on, it has ample opportunity to innovate by creating new tools 
and services that market-based models have been unable or unwilling 
to support. In this role, it might model two existing digital public service 
entities. Mozilla Firefox is the widely known open-source web browser 
that emphasizes user privacy, arguably a top priority in the digital public 
services space. Mozilla’s revenue comes almost exclusively from licensing 
deals with the web’s largest search engines – Google in the United States, 
Yandex in Russia, and Baidu in China.52 Despite the irony of sending web 
searchers into the arms of some of the world’s most surveillant compa-
nies, Mozilla creates key consumer tools to navigate the web more safely, 
including a plugin that counters Facebook’s cross-site tracking. Addition-
ally, Mozilla’s revenues fund the Mozilla Foundation, which is a major 
advocate for consumer protection online and a convener of open-source 
developers.
Working on a much smaller scale, Public Spaces is a coalition of Neth-
erlands-based organizations dedicated to redirecting government funding 
from large U.S. tech providers to open-source alternatives. Members of the 
coalition include the largest Dutch public broadcasters as well as major 
Dutch festivals and arts organizations. As creators of cultural works with 
broad reach in Dutch society, they seek to host online conversations about 
the works they’re commissioning and creating. Rather than hosting those 
discussions on a surveillant platform like Disqus, they are trying to move 
discussions to an open-source platform based on the open-source ISSO 
project, using IRMA for login and user management.53 To help public ser-
vice organizations decide what software they might choose, Public Spaces 
is developing a badging system that certifies the compliance of software 
while adhering to open-source and privacy principles. 
Public Spaces offers a possible model for the widespread adoption 
of new public service digital media tools – through public broadcasters 
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and public institutions that share the values of providing public services 
through media. Firefox points to the viability of large-scale nonprofit 
public service digital media projects, one that is not only self-sustaining 
but can also support other public service digital media efforts through its 
surpluses. Both invite us to think about what we could build beyond open-
source versions of existing web tools.
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SOME POSSIBLE PRINCIPLES FOR 
PUBLIC SERVICE DIGITAL MEDIA
Public service broadcasters have argued over the princi-ples of public service since John Reith prescribed a duty for the BBC to inform, educate, and entertain. The European Public Broadcast 
Union has determined a set of values that are laudable, if rather broad in the 
guidance they provide, asking that public service media strive for “universal-
ity, independence, excellence, diversity, accountability [and] innovation.”54 
Some possible principles for public service digital media might include:
Publicly Spirited, But Diverse in Funding
The goal of public service digital media is to fill gaps in the media land-
scape that have gone unfilled through market solutions, with an emphasis 
on the creation and adoption of tools that strengthen open and democratic 
societies. Such tools seek to inform their users. They enable groups to 
assemble and deliberate either through solidarity around a common iden-
tity or through productive encounters with diversity. They allow citizens to 
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mobilize groups to civic action online and offline.55 They seek to give users 
choice about how and when they share their personal information online 
and how and where they are tracked and to give users more insight and 
transparency into the algorithms that control what they see and experi-
ence online.
Some of these tools may not be sustainable through market mecha-
nisms, while others may be self-supporting after investment in develop-
ment and startup costs. The business model is not what characterizes a 
public service tool – Mozilla Firefox is both profitable and public-spirited 
– but its values and goals.
Plural in Purpose
Facebook supports over 2 billion users from all over the world through 
the same basic set of tools that were originally designed to link Harvard 
students to one another. While it’s a testament to Facebook’s design skills 
that such a platform works as well as it does, one size really doesn’t fit all. 
Some of the serious problems in online spaces stem from the fact that a 
toolset and accompanying ruleset that’s appropriate for one form of online 
interaction may be wildly inappropriate for another context.
Bahraini activist Esra’a al Shafei created Majal as a special purpose 
social network for Arab LGBTQ teens. The network enforces anonymity, 
and no profile pics are permitted – users create cartoon avatars instead 
– in order to ensure that the network can’t be used by local political or 
religious authorities to persecute users. To prevent trolls from disrupting 
the space, participants aren’t allowed to comment until they’ve logged in 
a certain number of times to read and can’t open new conversations until 
they’ve posted a number of supportive comments. These likely aren’t the 
right rules to talk with your high school friends on Facebook, but they’re 
appropriate for a community that’s highly surveilled and persecuted. 
Public service digital media tools shouldn’t seek to dominate mar-
kets through scale – they don’t need to assemble millions of eyeballs for 
resale to advertisers. Instead, they should support diverse use cases, more 
like WordPress, a flexible open-source publishing platform, than like a 
commercially funded entity like Facebook. Further, a public service digital 
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media model allows a diversity of platforms to serve a diversity of cultures 
with locally customized and appropriate tools, likely by giving communi-
ties more control over the rules that govern these new fora and how they 
are enforced.
Participatory in Governance
Robert Putnam’s lament Bowling Alone56 placed great weight on the civic 
implications of the shift from neighborhood-based civic organizations 
to mailing list–based lobbying organizations as the centerpiece of asso-
ciational life in America. Critics rightly point out that the organizations 
Putnam mourns were often popular because they excluded people by race 
or gender and provided a network of “loose ties” that could often serve 
as barriers to members of socially marginalized groups. But Putnam was 
right about one aspect of associational life: It helped train participants on 
the art of participating in self-governing communities, a critical skill for 
democratic practice outside of formal government structures.
A new generation is learning the lessons of community participation 
via online tools. Reddit, a massively popular online community platform, 
relies on its many volunteer moderators to allow their community to 
function. Each subcommunity – subreddit – has a set of rules about what 
conduct is allowable and what’s forbidden, and moderators enforce these 
rules, often putting in dozens of hours a week to ensure that content meets 
community standards and that participants understand why their content 
was permitted or banned.57 The process of setting these guidelines and 
discussing their enforcement is an ongoing civics lesson for those who 
keep the community running, and scholars have begun studying the strat-
egies for civic behavior used on Reddit to understand how communities 
learn and make decisions.58
Many of the problems faced by existing digital service providers come 
from moderation issues. Facebook is now moving toward a “supreme 
court” that allows outside reviewers to advise the company on its thorn-
iest content moderation issues, in addition to the tens of thousands of 
professional moderators it pays to enforce its terms of service. Even with 
these resources, Facebook is only able to function because it has a single 
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set of rules that – theoretically – applies everywhere across their site. 
The multiple rulesets anticipated in digital public infrastructures require 
self-governance both as a social good and to make possible a functionally 
diverse web.
Publicly Auditable and Reviewable
In August 2019, President Donald Trump latched onto a widely discredited 
academic paper that posited that Google might have swung millions of 
votes to Hillary Clinton in the 2016 election through posting pro-Hillary 
search results and suppressing pro-Trump ones.59 While the paper’s 
claims were overbroad and unsupportable, they build on a real phenome-
non. In 2012, Facebook conducted a study on 61 million users that demon-
strated that users could be encouraged to participate in elections by show-
ing pictures of their friends who’d reported that they had already voted.60 
The effect was small – people exposed to the treatment were 0.39 percent 
more likely to vote – but significant enough that Harvard Law School pro-
fessor Jonathan Zittrain observed that a close election could theoretically 
be swung by encouraging voters of a known political affiliation to vote and 
not mobilizing others.61 
There is no good way to ensure that what Zittrain speculates is not 
actually happening – the effects are so small that it would require a 
massive, coordinated audit to reveal such action. Further, it’s not clear 
that some audits are legal under the U.S. Computer Anti-Fraud and Abuse 
Act (CFAA).62 We rely on Google’s word that they are not skewing search 
results of a particular political affiliation and on Facebook’s word that 
they’re not suppressing conservative news (as Trump and others have 
accused them). 
We need new tools to enable scholars and public interest advocates 
to review the algorithms that rank search results and order social media 
posts while balancing the privacy rights of users. This raises a rich and 
complex set of problems that will require study as the large internet plat-
forms have not yet been subject to audit pressures. But the opportunity to 
build new platforms offers the possibility of engineering them from the 
ground up to be audit compliant and transparent about their operations.
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WHAT COULD WE BUILD?
Due to the paucity of engineers and entrepreneurs thinking about digital tools that meet civic needs instead of market needs, we don’t yet know what’s possible in this space. Tim Berners-Lee, 
the inventor of the World Wide Web, is experimenting with a new architec-
ture called Solid, in which user data remains under a user’s control and is 
shared with applications when they need it, rather than being owned by 
those platforms. Early in his thinking about Solid are a set of services that 
replicate existing services but protect user privacy and rights, as well as 
new applications that could leverage user ownership of transactional data 
to create new services.63 A parallel for what’s possible with Solid may be 
the transformation beginning in the European banking industry with the 
implementation of PSD2, a major financial services law requiring interop-
erability between digital banking services.64 We know a transformation is 
coming and that exciting new things are possible; we just don’t know what 
exactly to expect.
One obvious, but difficult to build, set of services are auditable and 
transparent search and discovery tools. Anyone who has maintained 
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an online presence, especially an online sales platform, understands how 
enormously powerful search engine ranking algorithms are – moving off 
the first page of search results often results in a crash in online referrals 
and sales. People who find themselves in such a predicament are desper-
ate to understand why their Google ranking has changed . . . and Google is 
wholly unwilling to share the details of their algorithm out of the under-
standable fear that any information they release will be used to game the 
algorithms, allowing unscrupulous companies and SEO professionals to 
advance their interests over public interests. 
Yet opaque ranking and discovery algorithms are becoming less 
publicly acceptable by the day. Concerns that YouTube’s recommendation 
algorithms are leading viewers to extremist content point to the need for 
the auditability and explainability of these discovery systems. My lab, 
MIT’s Center for Civic Media, has experimented with user-tunable filtering 
systems for social media through Gobo.social; users of the tool are able to 
choose what algorithms and thresholds eliminate or include content from 
their feeds. Designing more complex discovery systems around search and 
recommendation should be possible, if challenging.
Building a new search engine would be a moonshot, a massive under-
taking. A better start might be avoiding going head to head with Google 
on their best competency but taking on a subfield of search. Wikimedia 
briefly explored a Wikidata-powered question-answering search engine 
that would have directly challenged Wolfram Alpha and been a useful 
component for services like Siri or Alexa, but they abandoned the proj-
ect when community members expressed concerns about feasibility and 
scale.65 French and German programmers began work on a European rival 
to Google for indexing videos, images, and cultural works. The project, 
named Quaero,66 never led to a final project, but the goal – indexing the 
European cultural heritage – is entirely consistent with the spirit of public 
service digital media. 
The ultimate impact of a project on transparent and auditable search 
might not be a nonprofit competitor to Google but the emergence of a 
strategy that allows review – either by a select set of academics and regu-
lators or by a segment of the public audience – and resists gaming, which 
might then be incorporated by Google and others, allowing their claims of 
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unbiased search to be independently verified.
Another project that could directly challenge existing market leaders 
would be a non-surveillant advertising network. Google AdSense is 
the most popular tool used by webpage owners to monetize traffic to their 
pages. Google combines information from AdSense with tracking informa-
tion from any page running Google Analytics, running ads from Double-
Click or embedding YouTube ads to enable a surveillance system with a 
presence on as much as 80 percent of the web.67 Alternatives to AdSense 
include the Facebook Audience Network and Amazon’s Affiliates Program, 
which maintain similar webs of surveillance.
Sunil Abraham of the Centre for Internet and Society, a Banga-
lore-based research organization, proposes an ad network that could 
be based on machine parsing of the contents of a webpage to determine 
targeting information. Combining this targeting data with loose geodata 
– targeting a user to their city, perhaps, rather than their street address – 
could result in an ad product that allows users to monetize their content 
without surveilling their users, one that advertisers might choose to use 
as a socially responsible alternative to existing online ads. The popular-
ity of podcast sponsorship, which offers far less information about user 
behavior, but associates ads with high-quality content, suggests that there 
might be a market opportunity for this model and that a non-surveillant 
ad network could ultimately be self-sustaining or capable of cross-subsi-
dizing other projects.
Finally, public service digital media need to help create an ecosystem 
of alternative social networks, designed for use by a wide range of commu-
nities for conversation, deliberation, and mobilization. The problems social 
networks face – high prevalence of misinformation, polarization, and echo 
chambers, among others – are aggravated by their scale. The centralization 
of a network like Facebook means that a misinformation campaign that 
succeeds in Myanmar can be tried in Maryland, and there’s a decent chance 
that the lessons learned will be transferrable. Simultaneously, the opacity 
of these networks makes it impossible for anyone other than Facebook to 
fix the problems – unlike Reddit, where communities can experiment with 
different rulesets and interventions with the help of NGOs like CivilServant. 
Facebook is the only group that can solve Facebook’s problems.
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An alternative to the dominance of Facebook and Twitter in the social 
media space is a wave of alternative social media platforms designed to 
meet the needs of local geographic communities and communities of 
interest. Some of these communities might feature novel technical capa-
bilities, like the karma and moderation framework used in Majal; others 
might use preexisting tools like Asterisk or Mastodon and experiment 
with different community standards and rules of the road. Collectively, 
the growth of healthy communities could bring to light approaches to 
rules, norms, technological affordances, and moderation strategies that 
are more tolerant and equitable, which could lead to more widespread 
adoption. Early experiments like WikiTribune, which combines aspects 
of Wikipedia-style moderation and news discussion, and Gell.com, which 
asks users to list the pros and cons of controversial issues in a civil fash-
ion, show great promise for alternative models of interaction online.
A wave of pro-civic social media communities requires both techni-
cal advances around single sign-on (to make it easy to join and manage 
communities without different passwords for each one and without 
relying on Google or Facebook for login services), aggregation (to build 
a single client, a social media browser, that allows users to access all of 
their networks in one place), and interoperability (to ensure that networks 
can create new kinds of content while still enabling aggregators to read 
these new content types), and changes to legal frameworks. Case law in 
the United States suggests that platforms can refuse requests to aggregate 
their content or make it accessible through an API,68 although the success 
of the Data Transfer Project, a common standard for exporting social 
media, holds out the possibility that platforms may be decreasing their 
resistance to interoperability.69 Experiments like gobo.social and existing 
tools like Hootsuite suggest what social media browsers and aggregators 
might look like in a world with a wide array of social networks.
The real civic impact of a wave of innovation in special-purpose social 
networks would go beyond learning about how online communities can 
be better managed. It would contemplate the true integration of online 
and offline civic processes. My town of three thousand is governed by an 
annual town meeting, a highly ritualized exercise in which hundreds of 
citizens sit in an elementary school auditorium, arguing about the annual 
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town budget line by line. A social network active for the three days before 
and one day after the town meeting might transform a process that’s 
grown increasingly complex, intricate, and time-consuming since its intro-
duction in the eighteenth century.
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FIRST STEPS
It took years from Newt Minow’s warning about the “vast waste-land” until the establishment of the Corporation for Public Broad-casting and the founding of NPR and PBS. The BBC’s role as a neutral 
provider of news and a host of public conversations didn’t emerge fully 
formed under Reith and Matheson’s leadership but accumulated over 
decades. Achieving the goal of public service digital media as a powerful 
counterweight to surveillant and censorious models of platform control is 
a project that might take years to accomplish. But there are steps that can 
be taken today that would test the viability of the larger vision.
Legislators in the United States are expressing interest in regulating 
the tech platforms. Some of these regulations, including the ACCESS bill 
proposed by Senator Mark Warner, seek to increase competition by mak-
ing it easier for users to export their data and relationships from existing 
platforms.70 This logic echoes number portability, a policy change that 
unleashed growth in mobile telephony, as users suddenly were able to 
leave wireless carriers for competitors without losing the valuable real 
estate of their phone number. It’s not clear whether this is the appropriate 
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model for increasing competition for social media, as most social media 
users participate in multiple platforms, while most individuals have a 
single mobile phone carrier.
Legislation focused on interoperability may be more important than 
legislation focused on data portability. Much as Senator Warner’s legisla-
tion requires companies with annual revenues over $100 million to adopt 
portability measures, we could push for these large companies to maintain 
APIs that allow third parties to develop tools to enable users to interact 
with multiple social media streams through the same interface. Like RSS 
readers that allow readers to follow dozens of news sites through the same 
interface, these tools would support users who experiment with new, spe-
cial-purpose social networks. Without these tools, it’s likely that users will 
try an experimental social network once or twice but then not make it part 
of their regular routine. Further, a policy that enables third-party readers 
would allow privacy-respecting alternatives to existing social media appli-
cations, which relentlessly track a user’s behavior and clickstream.71 
Solutions that focus on interoperability won’t have an impact with-
out a wave of innovation in creating new digital public infrastructures, 
especially social networks. While the philanthropic community is rightly 
focused on countering surveillance and limiting the power of platforms 
through legislation, this agenda runs the risk of continually “playing 
defense” without offering an affirmative vision to work toward. This 
critical defensive work needs to be complemented with a wave of funding 
focused on experimentation around what might be possible with pur-
pose-built social networks, specialized search engines, new technologies 
for revenue generation, and other digital public services. Philanthropic 
and government funders should focus on funding a range of experiments, 
accepting that some will fail, with the expectation that successes will 
spark interest in pushing the boundaries of what constitutes the digital 
public infrastructure.
To steer this proposed experimentation, we need a focused research 
agenda that challenges some of the “common knowledge” about the 
effects of digital media. If recommendation algorithms on platforms like 
YouTube are leading viewers toward radicalization, we need to prioritize 
experimentation in other ways to discover different videos72; if radical-
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ization stems from interactions in the video comments instead, we need 
experimentation in moderating conversations around videos. Rather than 
regulating platforms based on uncertain scientific conclusions, it would 
be wise for governments and philanthropies to fund rigorous research 
about the effects of social media on individual health and on our broader 
civic health and then foster direct experimentation and policy in ways that 
follow what scholars discover.
Finally, for the ideas outlined here to be relevant, there needs to be a 
proof of concept that revenues can be generated to support experimenta-
tion, research, and development of sound policy. One first step could be 
introducing legislation around taxation of surveillant advertising within 
EU countries, where sensitivities to privacy tend to be stronger than in the 
United States and where taxing U.S. companies may be more easily accom-
plished than in, say, California.
The ideas put forward in this essay, especially about taxation of 
surveillant advertising, may not be easy to realize, especially in the United 
States, where ongoing political crises make it difficult to accomplish com-
plex policy changes. There are worthwhile arguments about whether the 
principles and projects I’ve suggested are the most pressing ones. I’m com-
fortable with any of those arguments. My point is not to solve the problem 
of public service digital media but to open a conversation about it.
At this moment in the evolution of the Web, we are comfortable 
having wide-ranging arguments about the shortcomings and failings of 
existing digital platforms. We are nowhere near as good at proposing and 
exploring alternatives, and this failure of imagination means that we are 
ceding the future of the internet to the companies that have already taken 
power. 
Public service digital media offers us the opportunity to imagine what 
could be possible. What is the media environment we want?
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